• nxdefiant@startrek.website
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          1 year ago

          It doesn’t matter if he personally loved every single Ukrainian that died, the fact is that even if you believe everything that was done to mitigate it was a best effort, and that everything that led to the union at large being essentially helpless to feed its people was an accident, it still paints the picture of a big talker that managed a country into the ground.

          At best, in the most forgiving light, Stalin was an incompetent head of state, regardless of how smart he was, and was responsible for a lot of people who died reaching out their hands begging for help while he pulled out his pockets and shrugged. And that would have been the end of it, but no, he goes and waxes poetically about how starving people don’t have freedom while the graves are still fresh.

          • Alaskaball [comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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            1 year ago

            Uh huh so by your logic then every world leader that exists, has existed, and will exist is a genocidal monster on the same level of Stalin because there’s always some form of poverty in the world.

            At least you’re consistent with your dumb take.

          • it still paints the picture of a big talker that managed a country into the ground.

            I suppose if you squint at it and ignore all the other stuff sure? But the problems with famine relief were mainly local and partially caused by kulak sabotage (and they bragged about how effective that sabotage was, you can look it up), when the central committee understood the extent of the problem measures were quickly taken.

            If we look at other facts though, like how successful collective farming was at breaking the cycle of famine and how rapidly the Soviets were able to industrialize, quick enough to defeat nazi-ism lose 1/6 of their population in the fight and still make it to space before anyone else, it paints a much better picture of the competence of soviet democratic economic management.

              • Abraxiel@hexbear.net
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                1 year ago

                Because the rapid industrialization and according massive reorganization of the economy and productive capacity of the country was messy and imperfect. And also because famines are only really uncommon in already industrialized economies.

                • JuneFall [none/use name]@hexbear.net
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                  1 year ago

                  In addition civil war, kulaks burning food, imperfect management science (Taylorism which had problems with adjusting controlling to the reality on the ground), natural disasters and bad climate for crops. For example even when harvest was going on in plenty of areas the weather was too damp to gather crops at the ideal point in time which greatly diminishes your harvest. The same process could be seen this year in Europe.

                  The UK did embargo the Soviet Union till Lenin’s NEP and similar things did happen regularly, this means that international finance and industrial capital would’ve often sought other countries in which they didn’t have to fear such things, too. This means that the Soviet Union had to try to generate capital from other sources and those are the the surplus of the working class or the savings of people (vs. consumption).

          • Alaskaball [comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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            1 year ago

            When the Nazis were on the outskirts of Moscow, Stalin stood his ground alongside the entire Soviet leadership as the city faced what possibly would’ve been its last moments.

            He was literally so close to the front lines the NKVD had to make sure he didn’t accidentally enter any of the minefields that were set up in the city when he took his walks through the city to review the defenses or to go back to his apartment.

              • Alaskaball [comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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                1 year ago

                Even funnier, or not - it depends I guess - is that I know this because Beria joked about how easy it was for him to assassinate Stalin during the war while the Nazis were outside of Moscow by simply letting him step on a mine.

                  • Alaskaball [comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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                    1 year ago

                    Also some reading on Stalin in Moscow.

                    Stalin stayed in Moscow. On November 7, 1941, while German guns roared in the suburbs and Hitler announced Moscow already taken, Stalin reviewed the troops in Red Square.

                    Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 98

                    In his memoirs, Khrushchev portrays Stalin’s panic and confusion in the first days of the war and later. I saw no such behavior. Stalin did not isolate himself in his dacha until June 30th, 1941. The Kremlin diary shows he was regularly receiving visitors and monitoring the deteriorating situation. From the very beginning of the war, Stalin received Beria & Merkulov [cohead of the Soviet security service] in the Kremlin two or three times a day. They usually returned to NKVD headquarters late at night, or sometimes called in their orders directly from the Kremlin. It appeared to me that the administrative mechanism of command and control was functioning without interruption. In fact, Eitingon and I maintained a deep belief in our ultimate victory because of the calm, clear, businesslike issuance of these orders. On Nov. 6, 1941, I received an invitation to attend the October Revolution anniversary gathering in the Mayakovsky subway station. Traditionally, these celebrations were held in the Bolshoi Theatre, but this time, for security reasons, it was arranged on the subway platform. … Stalin spoke for about 30 minutes. I was deeply moved, because his confidence and self-assurance symbolized our ability to resist the Germans.

                    Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 134

                    This excerpt from Izvestia, #6, 1990 confirms Sudoplatov’s contention that Stalin, contrary to Khrushchev’s claims in his memoirs, was not immobilized by panic after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, but rather received a steady stream of visitors at his Kremlin study.

                    Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 433

                    It is worth recording Dimitrov’s attitude toward Stalin. He, too, spoke of him with admiration and respect, but without any conspicuous flattery or reverence…. He recounted: “When the Germans were outside Moscow, a general uncertainty and confusion ensued. The Soviet government had withdrawn to Kuibyshev. But Stalin remained in Moscow. I was with him at the time, in the Kremlin. They were taking out archives from the Kremlin. I proposed to Stalin that the Comintern direct a proclamation to the German soldiers. He agreed, though he felt no good would come of it. Soon after, I too had to leave Moscow. Stalin did not leave; he was determined to defend it. And at that most dramatic moment he held a parade in Red Square on the anniversary of the October Revolution. The divisions before him were leaving for the front. One cannot express how great a moral significance was exerted when the people learned that Stalin was sitting in Moscow and when they heard his words. It restored their faith and raised their confidence, and it was worth more than a good-sized army.”

                    Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 37

                    Moscow was bombed by German aviation. Panic began to seize the city’s population. The Nazis were only 80 kilometres away. Part of the administration was evacuated. But Stalin decided to remain in Moscow. The battles became more and more fierce and, in early November, the Nazi offensive was stopped. After consulting with Zhukov, Stalin took the decision to organize the traditional November 7 military parade on Red Square. It was a formidable challenge to the Nazi troops camped at the gates of Moscow. Stalin made a speech, which was broadcast to the entire country.

                    Martens, Ludo. Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p. 247 [p. 224 on the NET]

                    [In September 1941] The situation at the front is bad…. If it becomes necessary to abandon Moscow we can’t be sure that [the leadership will stand firm–implied]…. In the Instantsia they are not quite sure either that [Stalin will stand firm–implied]…. Stalin stands for war to the end…. While with others…Brest-Litovsk is in the air.

                    Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 307

                    We must get the peasant going and instill in him the hatred of the enemy…. What a brilliant order of Stalin’s to the Army…. “A fighter should not die without leaving the corpse of a German interventionist by his side. Kill him with a machine-gun, or rifle, a bayonet…. If you’re wounded, sink your teeth into his throat and strangle him as you would a wild beast”.

                    Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 309

                    The main blow was aimed directly at the capital, Moscow, whose outskirts were reached by late fall. Almost all the government offices had been evacuated to the east. But Stalin remained in the capital, where he assumed personal command of the war. On Dec. 2, 1941, the Nazis were stopped in the suburbs of Moscow. In December 6, Stalin ordered the first major counterattack to occur in World War II.

                    Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 31

                    As to Stalin’s nerves, or lack of them, his generals make no criticisms. Rather, Marshal Zhukov told a war correspondent that Stalin had ‘nerves of steel’. The correspondent, author Ehrenburg, wrote that the Marshal repeated these words to him several times when they met at a command post near the front line early in the war. Even General Vlasov who had a great grievance against Stalin and, therefore, cause for resentment, told the Germans upon his capture that Stalin had strong nerves. Speaking to Dr. Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, he said that in the autumn of 1941, when the city of Moscow was threatened by advancing German armies, every one in the Kremlin had lost his nerve but only Stalin insisted on continued resistance to the German invaders.

                    Axell, Albert. Stalin’s War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 168

                  • Alaskaball [comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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                    1 year ago

                    Aaaa I deleted my long-ass reply

                    Gimme like an hour or two to get off mobile and give you a quality answer.

                    Quick answer is: a lot of mystery is around beria that’s still locked away in the soviet archives, and realistically the best way to gage him would be in the writings of those who were around him during the time he was alive. I’m keeping an equally open mind on him as I do with other Soviet leadership.

                  • Alaskaball [comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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                    1 year ago

                    Okay I hope you like reading.

                    Beria wasn’t Stalin’s first pick for the Job Beria would later assume

                    In the fall of 1938, when the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But the majority of the Politburo recommended Beria for the post.

                    Getty and Manning. Stalinist Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 38

                    The Russian historian Boris Starkov has recently written that in Politburo meetings during August 1938 Zhdanov and Andreev stressed the poor quality of party cadres promoted during the mass repressions. Soon Kaganovich and Mikoyan joined them “against Yezhov.” Then in the fall, according to Starkov, Stalin proposed replacing Yezhov with Malenkov. But the rest of the Politburo blocked the Gensec and insisted on Beria, though why is not clear.

                    Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 131

                    One of Stalin’s last living bodyguards liked Beria as much as he liked Kruschev

                    How can anyone now allow himself the stupidity of criticizing Stalin for repression and crimes? This was a psychosis that was cleverly instituted by Yezhov and other enemies of the State… this psychosis took over the minds of millions of people. Practically all were involved in looking for “enemies.” The Central Committee ACP[B] was against this, fought this tooth and nail—Stalin in particular. People got involved in this, and friends were “drowning” friends in the name of getting rid of “enemies.” Of course, this cannot all be explained as a mass psychosis! In all the examinations that were conducted into this period, we had 30-40 people going over the same documents, but NOWHERE did we EVER find the name of Stalin, or the command of Stalin, or the resolution to do these things which were undertaken by the REAL ENEMIES of the Soviet people. No directives either of Stalin, Molotov, or Voroshilov were to be found in all of these documents. According to my way of thinking, Stalin also bears some blame because he was the Head of the Motherland. His fault was that he was always favoring “collective decisions” and thus was fooled by his “comrades-in-arms.” Yagoda, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Beria, and others. Yezhov, Stalin spotted from the start and took steps to stop him and get rid of him.

                    Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 80

                    It was likely that Beria played a key role in stopping the greatest excesses of the Ezhovshchina

                    Beria boldly told Stalin that Yezhov, who had succeeded Yagoda the year before as Chief of the Commissariat of the Interior…had passed all bounds of reason and discrimination in his conduct of the Purge;…

                    Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 229

                    Early in 1938, however, Stalin became disturbed by the mounting fury of the Ezhovshchina. His purpose of liquidating the old Bolsheviks and the veterans of the Revolution and the Civil War, and other sources of opposition, had been achieved. But under Yezhov the purge had spread like a malignant plague. Everywhere people were spying and informing against each other and everywhere arrests were on the increase. Terror was raging out of control. Stalin saw the need to call a halt. He showed the same sense of timing and the same authority, which he had displayed nearly eight years earlier with his article “Dizziness From Success.” In January 1938 a central committee passed a resolution which heralded what was to be called the “Great Change.” The title of the resolution was “Concerning the Mistakes of Party Organizations in Excluding Communists from the Party, Concerning Formal-Bureaucratic Attitudes Towards the Appeals of Excluded Members of the Bolshevik Party, and Concerning Measures to Eliminate These Deficiencies.” The new orders were passed quickly to the party secretaries at every level and to the command points of the NKVD, and emanating from the Kremlin in Moscow. They were promptly obeyed. The new enemy was identified now as the Communist-careerist. He had taken advantage of the purge to denounce his superiors and to gain promotion. He was guilty of spreading suspicion and of undermining the party. A purge of careerists was launched. At the same time mass repressions diminished and the rehabilitation of victimized party members began. The real halt to the great purge came, however, in July 1938, when Beria was appointed Yezhov’s deputy. He took charge of the NKVD at once, although Yezhov was not removed until December 1938, when he was made Commissar for Inland Water Transport. Soon afterwards he was shot. Many NKVD officers were tried and executed for extracting confessions from innocent people, while others were relegated to labor camps. Loyal party members, emerging from the long nightmare, were relieved by the purging of the NKVD. It confirmed their belief that fascists had insinuated themselves into the security forces and the government and that they were responsible for the cruel persecutions and injustices of the Ezhovshchina. This explanation was encouraged officially, and it absolved Stalin and the Politburo of responsibility. Directly controlling every branch of Soviet society and deeply involved in the buildup of the armed forces and conduct of foreign policy, Stalin could not maintain detailed control over the purge. He was aware that the NKVD had arrested many who were not guilty and that of the 7 to 14 million people serving sentences of forced labor in the GULAG camps many were innocent of any taint of disloyalty…. He resented this waste of human material. The aircraft designer Yakovlev recorded a conversation with him in 1940, in which Stalin exclaimed: “Yezhov was a rat; in 1938 he killed many innocent people. We shot him for that!”

                    Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 288

        • nxdefiant@startrek.website
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          1 year ago

          I don’t blame trump for COVID, but I do blame him for the piss poor response and unnecessary deaths that could have been prevented were it not for willful mismanagement, blatant ignorance, and a cabinet woefully unprepared to deal with a megalomaniac hell bent on letting karma motorboat through a demographic he didn’t find any value in.

          Sounds pretty familiar yeah?

          • iie [they/them, he/him]@hexbear.net
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            1 year ago

            I know this nerd has been banned, but for posterity I’ll point out that the circumstances were completely fucking different.

            COVID in America: you have a 21st century nation with internet, global trade, well-established information and logistics networks, clear understanding of the extent and nature of the threat, most of the world’s top universities and biomedical research labs, you have fucking hundreds of thousands of people with lifelong specialist training in science, technology, emergency response, public messaging, and any other conceivable discipline relevant to managing a fucking pandemic, and you have all the money on earth to give them.

            Soviet famine: you have a rural post-revolutionary state still racing to industrialize and prepare for war, still mostly uneducated and illiterate, no foreign trade, extremely rudimentary information and logistics networks, no way to establish any sort of responsive feedback control loop to manage the situation, and no way to fucking conjure more food out of the ground. There’s no n95 to hand out, no stipend to stay home, no social distancing, no vaccine. All you can do is spread the scraps around and keep the farmers farming and workers working.

        • nxdefiant@startrek.website
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          1 year ago

          Those are just facts. He did a lot of horrid shit. Sending a fuckload of people to clog up the Nazi meat grinder with their bodies isn’t heroism, it’s the last desperate act of someone trying to save their own ass.

          The Russians that died in the city Stalin named after himself are the heroes who defeated Fascism.

          • ThereRisesARedStar [she/her, they/them]@hexbear.net
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            1 year ago

            Sending a fuckload of people to clog up the Nazi meat grinder with their bodies isn’t heroism

            Except that is just the “mongol horde” myth spread by the nazis. The soviet military was a modern military which fought as a modern military. The “not one step back” order was directed at higher officers who favored unnecessary withdrawals at the expense of ceding territory that the nazis would start exterminating and of leaving the flanks of other army formations vulnerable.

          • commiewithoutorgans [he/him, comrade/them]@hexbear.net
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            1 year ago

            Jesus Christ your example is the single most impressive war in history(edit: actually don’t wanna take away from the Korean comrades or Angolan comrades or vietnamese comrades, they also did amazing) and blaming the General leading it for not being one of the soldiers?? Fuck me, that’s such a terrible example. I’m one of the 70-30 good-bad people on Stalin, which is about 50 percent better than any westen leader ever. But you chose like the literal best thing he ever did that can be attributed at least significantly to him.

            He managed to not only keep the Germans waiting too long (where soviets were then able to build up their military during the war to lead to their success) but also pull the rest of the world into the war to their assistance (diplomacy and manoeuvering). Otherwise I don’t think western countries would’ve actually stopped the Nazi’s tbh, or even tried to help.

            Of course the millions of dead soviets did the work and died under Stalin. And the rest of the population was saved by the sacrifice and Stalin mourned and celebrated them despite not being on the front lines.

              • You’re right, I took too much credit from him. I guess I meant he never put himself into the situations where death was a 70% certainty like many Soviet soldiers heroically did. But good leadership also means living and being commander when you might not even want to (referring to Stalin wanting to end his position)