The famine being a genocide was misinfo spread by nazi publications such as hearst press. The misinfo was used as justification for murdering Jewish people as “soviet collaborators”
It doesn’t matter if he personally loved every single Ukrainian that died, the fact is that even if you believe everything that was done to mitigate it was a best effort, and that everything that led to the union at large being essentially helpless to feed its people was an accident, it still paints the picture of a big talker that managed a country into the ground.
At best, in the most forgiving light, Stalin was an incompetent head of state, regardless of how smart he was, and was responsible for a lot of people who died reaching out their hands begging for help while he pulled out his pockets and shrugged. And that would have been the end of it, but no, he goes and waxes poetically about how starving people don’t have freedom while the graves are still fresh.
Uh huh so by your logic then every world leader that exists, has existed, and will exist is a genocidal monster on the same level of Stalin because there’s always some form of poverty in the world.
it still paints the picture of a big talker that managed a country into the ground.
I suppose if you squint at it and ignore all the other stuff sure? But the problems with famine relief were mainly local and partially caused by kulak sabotage (and they bragged about how effective that sabotage was, you can look it up), when the central committee understood the extent of the problem measures were quickly taken.
If we look at other facts though, like how successful collective farming was at breaking the cycle of famine and how rapidly the Soviets were able to industrialize, quick enough to defeat nazi-ism lose 1/6 of their population in the fight and still make it to space before anyone else, it paints a much better picture of the competence of soviet democratic economic management.
Because the rapid industrialization and according massive reorganization of the economy and productive capacity of the country was messy and imperfect. And also because famines are only really uncommon in already industrialized economies.
In addition civil war, kulaks burning food, imperfect management science (Taylorism which had problems with adjusting controlling to the reality on the ground), natural disasters and bad climate for crops. For example even when harvest was going on in plenty of areas the weather was too damp to gather crops at the ideal point in time which greatly diminishes your harvest. The same process could be seen this year in Europe.
The UK did embargo the Soviet Union till Lenin’s NEP and similar things did happen regularly, this means that international finance and industrial capital would’ve often sought other countries in which they didn’t have to fear such things, too. This means that the Soviet Union had to try to generate capital from other sources and those are the the surplus of the working class or the savings of people (vs. consumption).
When the Nazis were on the outskirts of Moscow, Stalin stood his ground alongside the entire Soviet leadership as the city faced what possibly would’ve been its last moments.
He was literally so close to the front lines the NKVD had to make sure he didn’t accidentally enter any of the minefields that were set up in the city when he took his walks through the city to review the defenses or to go back to his apartment.
Even funnier, or not - it depends I guess - is that I know this because Beria joked about how easy it was for him to assassinate Stalin during the war while the Nazis were outside of Moscow by simply letting him step on a mine.
Stalin stayed in Moscow. On November 7, 1941, while German guns roared in the suburbs and Hitler announced Moscow already taken, Stalin reviewed the troops in Red Square.
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 98
In his memoirs, Khrushchev portrays Stalin’s panic and confusion in the first days of the war and later. I saw no such behavior. Stalin did not isolate himself in his dacha until June 30th, 1941. The Kremlin diary shows he was regularly receiving visitors and monitoring the deteriorating situation. From the very beginning of the war, Stalin received Beria & Merkulov [cohead of the Soviet security service] in the Kremlin two or three times a day. They usually returned to NKVD headquarters late at night, or sometimes called in their orders directly from the Kremlin. It appeared to me that the administrative mechanism of command and control was functioning without interruption. In fact, Eitingon and I maintained a deep belief in our ultimate victory because of the calm, clear, businesslike issuance of these orders.
On Nov. 6, 1941, I received an invitation to attend the October Revolution anniversary gathering in the Mayakovsky subway station. Traditionally, these celebrations were held in the Bolshoi Theatre, but this time, for security reasons, it was arranged on the subway platform.
… Stalin spoke for about 30 minutes. I was deeply moved, because his confidence and self-assurance symbolized our ability to resist the Germans.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 134
This excerpt from Izvestia, #6, 1990 confirms Sudoplatov’s contention that Stalin, contrary to Khrushchev’s claims in his memoirs, was not immobilized by panic after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, but rather received a steady stream of visitors at his Kremlin study.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 433
It is worth recording Dimitrov’s attitude toward Stalin. He, too, spoke of him with admiration and respect, but without any conspicuous flattery or reverence….
He recounted: “When the Germans were outside Moscow, a general uncertainty and confusion ensued. The Soviet government had withdrawn to Kuibyshev. But Stalin remained in Moscow. I was with him at the time, in the Kremlin. They were taking out archives from the Kremlin. I proposed to Stalin that the Comintern direct a proclamation to the German soldiers. He agreed, though he felt no good would come of it. Soon after, I too had to leave Moscow. Stalin did not leave; he was determined to defend it. And at that most dramatic moment he held a parade in Red Square on the anniversary of the October Revolution. The divisions before him were leaving for the front. One cannot express how great a moral significance was exerted when the people learned that Stalin was sitting in Moscow and when they heard his words. It restored their faith and raised their confidence, and it was worth more than a good-sized army.”
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 37
Moscow was bombed by German aviation. Panic began to seize the city’s population. The Nazis were only 80 kilometres away. Part of the administration was evacuated. But Stalin decided to remain in Moscow. The battles became more and more fierce and, in early November, the Nazi offensive was stopped. After consulting with Zhukov, Stalin took the decision to organize the traditional November 7 military parade on Red Square. It was a formidable challenge to the Nazi troops camped at the gates of Moscow. Stalin made a speech, which was broadcast to the entire country.
Martens, Ludo. Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p. 247 [p. 224 on the NET]
[In September 1941] The situation at the front is bad…. If it becomes necessary to abandon Moscow we can’t be sure that [the leadership will stand firm–implied]…. In the Instantsia they are not quite sure either that [Stalin will stand firm–implied]…. Stalin stands for war to the end…. While with others…Brest-Litovsk is in the air.
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 307
We must get the peasant going and instill in him the hatred of the enemy…. What a brilliant order of Stalin’s to the Army…. “A fighter should not die without leaving the corpse of a German interventionist by his side. Kill him with a machine-gun, or rifle, a bayonet…. If you’re wounded, sink your teeth into his throat and strangle him as you would a wild beast”.
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 309
The main blow was aimed directly at the capital, Moscow, whose outskirts were reached by late fall. Almost all the government offices had been evacuated to the east. But Stalin remained in the capital, where he assumed personal command of the war. On Dec. 2, 1941, the Nazis were stopped in the suburbs of Moscow. In December 6, Stalin ordered the first major counterattack to occur in World War II.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 31
As to Stalin’s nerves, or lack of them, his generals make no criticisms. Rather, Marshal Zhukov told a war correspondent that Stalin had ‘nerves of steel’. The correspondent, author Ehrenburg, wrote that the Marshal repeated these words to him several times when they met at a command post near the front line early in the war.
Even General Vlasov who had a great grievance against Stalin and, therefore, cause for resentment, told the Germans upon his capture that Stalin had strong nerves. Speaking to Dr. Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, he said that in the autumn of 1941, when the city of Moscow was threatened by advancing German armies, every one in the Kremlin had lost his nerve but only Stalin insisted on continued resistance to the German invaders.
Axell, Albert. Stalin’s War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 168
This is what Kraskyn, Stalin’s confidant and the Press Department’s senior war correspondent, wrote regarding the outbreak of the German-Russo war:
… “Stalin remained at Sochi until the end of the month. The direct telephone line which connected his villa with the Kremlin was in constant use with Molotov at the other end. Stalin never showed bad temper, remained calm, and determined.”
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 139
The Wehrmacht’s first offensive was launched against Moscow for Hitler well knew the city had always been a symbol to the Russians, and that if his troops could conquer this political and spiritual center, it would be a milestone on the road to the defeat of the Soviet Union.
Stalin realized this too. He attended all meetings of the Committee of the Defense of the City, and addressed his people regularly, but despite superhuman efforts by the Red fighting forces and the Soviet population, the Nazi armies advanced inexorably towards Moscow. Stalin was forced to order the evacuation of women and children from the Red capital. He issued an Order of the Day, declaring that Moscow would be defended to the last, and at the same time, a state of siege was proclaimed.
The next day, the Soviet Government and Diplomatic Corps established themselves in Kuibyshev in the middle Volga. Certain Government Departments had been transferred to Kazan and Sverdlovsk. Stalin, Molotov, and other members of the ” Inner Circle,” remained in Moscow.
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 143
Stalin was affable and had the common touch. He showed courage, particularly during the war. During the war, he preferred to work at the dacha rather than in the Kremlin, even though there were no air-raid shelters at the dacha. During an air attack, he would sometimes watch the planes from the roof of the building. According to Rybin, Stalin did not panic in mid-October 1941 when German forward units had reached the suburbs of Moscow. While Beria gave orders to senior party officials for the evacuation of Moscow on the evening of October 15 and although Malenkov and Kaganovich also recommended the move to Kuibyshev, Stalin, in a Kremlin meeting on Oct. 16, announced that he had decided to stay in Moscow.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 148
There were riots in Moscow at the time, and shops were pillaged. According to Rybin, Stalin deliberately showed himself in various parts of the city and talked to people to give a boost to morale. Molotov was sent for three days to Kuibyshev to supervise the transfer of the foreign ministry, but he also confirmed in conversation with Rybin that Stalin had no intention of leaving the capital…. When information was received that an unexploded mine or shell had landed not far from the dacha, Stalin joined the search party–yet another demonstration of personal courage.
…On a visit to Oryol in 1946, he walked the streets accompanied by hundreds of citizens. When they thanked him for having defeated the Germans, he replied modestly: “The people defeated the Germans, not I.”
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 149
I am often asked about Stalin’s role in the battle Moscow.
Stalin was in Moscow, in control of the troops and weapons, preparing the enemy’s defeat. He must be given credit for the enormous work in organizing necessary strategic, material, and technical resources which he did as head of the State Committee for Defense with the help of the executive staff of the People’s Commissariats. With strictness and exactingness Stalin achieved the near-impossible.
When I am asked what event in the war impressed me most, I always say: the Battle of Moscow.
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 361
For a long time now, there are stories, lies, outright falsifications that the war scared Stalin out of his wits. In view of these lies, let me tell of an incident. On May 5, at a meeting in the Kremlin, one of the scared officers said that the Central Committee armored train is ready and hidden. Stalin really let him have it:…
What kind of nonsense! What kind of safety armored train, when the enemy is inside the borders of the Soviet Union!
You can draw your own conclusion from this statement….
At the beginning of the war with the German attack on the USSR, this news was conveyed to Stalin by Marshall Zhukov. Already at 3 a.m., Stalin came into his office at the Kremlin. After that came in Zhukov and Timoshenko. Stalin regularly walked on the streets of Moscow, even during the flights of German aircraft. But he understood that people must see him amongst themselves, that the leader is with them, that he is in the capital of Moscow, and is heading its defense. Even more effective, he visited command posts on Gorky Street, Zemlianov Valley, Smolensky Square. For the sentries and army personnel, this had a tremendous effect.
Sometimes at the beginning of the war, at about 4 o’clock in the morning, Stalin was on Kaluzhki Square. Underneath, you could hear the crunch of broken glass. Around us, there were wooden homes, ambulances were racing to and fro, taking the dead and tending the wounded civilians and soldiers, right in Moscow. We were surrounded by crying women with children in their arms. Looking at them with tears in his eyes, Stalin told Vlasik:
We must evacuate the children deep into the interior of the country.
All of them stared to ask as to when will the Red Army stop the German Fascists! Stalin tried to console them with these well-known words:
There will be, there will be a holiday and dancing on this street of ours!
After being bombed by German planes, we went into Gorky Street. A woman with a flashlight came up to Stalin and scolded him:
Is it permissible for you to wander on the street, comrade Stalin, during such dangerous times? An enemy could easily drop a bomb on you!
Stalin only opened up his arms. Of course, the lady was correct. He was with us near Kubinka when over 400 planes were in the air, bombing while our fighters tried to shoot them down. After successfully repulsing the enemy, Stalin asked for the names of our pilots who did such an outstanding job. He met Victor Talakhin who did an outstanding job of shooting down German planes.
The enemy knew exactly where Stalin had his Dacha. Stalin risked his life together with all of us. Stalin always looked at the tremendous dogfights over the Dacha, when the Germans desperately tried to kill Stalin and his entourage, knowing in advance that they were there. They dropped bombs near the Dacha, some exploded, others did not, and we had to diffuse them, knowing full well that if they went off, everyone around the perimeter of the Dacha would be killed.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 28-30
Gimme like an hour or two to get off mobile and give you a quality answer.
Quick answer is: a lot of mystery is around beria that’s still locked away in the soviet archives, and realistically the best way to gage him would be in the writings of those who were around him during the time he was alive. I’m keeping an equally open mind on him as I do with other Soviet leadership.
Beria wasn’t Stalin’s first pick for the Job Beria would later assume
In the fall of 1938, when the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But the majority of the Politburo recommended Beria for the post.
Getty and Manning. Stalinist Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 38
The Russian historian Boris Starkov has recently written that in Politburo meetings during August 1938 Zhdanov and Andreev stressed the poor quality of party cadres promoted during the mass repressions. Soon Kaganovich and Mikoyan joined them “against Yezhov.” Then in the fall, according to Starkov, Stalin proposed replacing Yezhov with Malenkov. But the rest of the Politburo blocked the Gensec and insisted on Beria, though why is not clear.
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 131
One of Stalin’s last living bodyguards liked Beria as much as he liked Kruschev
How can anyone now allow himself the stupidity of criticizing Stalin for repression and crimes? This was a psychosis that was cleverly instituted by Yezhov and other enemies of the State… this psychosis took over the minds of millions of people. Practically all were involved in looking for “enemies.” The Central Committee ACP[B] was against this, fought this tooth and nail—Stalin in particular. People got involved in this, and friends were “drowning” friends in the name of getting rid of “enemies.” Of course, this cannot all be explained as a mass psychosis! In all the examinations that were conducted into this period, we had 30-40 people going over the same documents, but NOWHERE did we EVER find the name of Stalin, or the command of Stalin, or the resolution to do these things which were undertaken by the REAL ENEMIES of the Soviet people. No directives either of Stalin, Molotov, or Voroshilov were to be found in all of these documents.
According to my way of thinking, Stalin also bears some blame because he was the Head of the Motherland. His fault was that he was always favoring “collective decisions” and thus was fooled by his “comrades-in-arms.” Yagoda, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Beria, and others. Yezhov, Stalin spotted from the start and took steps to stop him and get rid of him.
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 80
It was likely that Beria played a key role in stopping the greatest excesses of the Ezhovshchina
Beria boldly told Stalin that Yezhov, who had succeeded Yagoda the year before as Chief of the Commissariat of the Interior…had passed all bounds of reason and discrimination in his conduct of the Purge;…
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 229
Early in 1938, however, Stalin became disturbed by the mounting fury of the Ezhovshchina. His purpose of liquidating the old Bolsheviks and the veterans of the Revolution and the Civil War, and other sources of opposition, had been achieved. But under Yezhov the purge had spread like a malignant plague. Everywhere people were spying and informing against each other and everywhere arrests were on the increase. Terror was raging out of control. Stalin saw the need to call a halt. He showed the same sense of timing and the same authority, which he had displayed nearly eight years earlier with his article “Dizziness From Success.”
In January 1938 a central committee passed a resolution which heralded what was to be called the “Great Change.” The title of the resolution was “Concerning the Mistakes of Party Organizations in Excluding Communists from the Party, Concerning Formal-Bureaucratic Attitudes Towards the Appeals of Excluded Members of the Bolshevik Party, and Concerning Measures to Eliminate These Deficiencies.” The new orders were passed quickly to the party secretaries at every level and to the command points of the NKVD, and emanating from the Kremlin in Moscow. They were promptly obeyed. The new enemy was identified now as the Communist-careerist. He had taken advantage of the purge to denounce his superiors and to gain promotion. He was guilty of spreading suspicion and of undermining the party. A purge of careerists was launched. At the same time mass repressions diminished and the rehabilitation of victimized party members began.
The real halt to the great purge came, however, in July 1938, when Beria was appointed Yezhov’s deputy. He took charge of the NKVD at once, although Yezhov was not removed until December 1938, when he was made Commissar for Inland Water Transport. Soon afterwards he was shot.
Many NKVD officers were tried and executed for extracting confessions from innocent people, while others were relegated to labor camps. Loyal party members, emerging from the long nightmare, were relieved by the purging of the NKVD. It confirmed their belief that fascists had insinuated themselves into the security forces and the government and that they were responsible for the cruel persecutions and injustices of the Ezhovshchina. This explanation was encouraged officially, and it absolved Stalin and the Politburo of responsibility.
Directly controlling every branch of Soviet society and deeply involved in the buildup of the armed forces and conduct of foreign policy, Stalin could not maintain detailed control over the purge. He was aware that the NKVD had arrested many who were not guilty and that of the 7 to 14 million people serving sentences of forced labor in the GULAG camps many were innocent of any taint of disloyalty…. He resented this waste of human material. The aircraft designer Yakovlev recorded a conversation with him in 1940, in which Stalin exclaimed: “Yezhov was a rat; in 1938 he killed many innocent people. We shot him for that!”
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 288
Beginning in the summer of 1938 a coalition of Politburo members, reportedly consisting of Zhdanov, Andreev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov, worked to limit Yezhov’s and the NKVD’s powers. In August, Beria was appointed Deputy People’s Commissar of the NKVD without Yezhov’s consent. During the fall, the Politburo restricted the NKVD’s power somewhat and appointed a series of commissions to investigate NKVD operations, arrest procedures, and Yezhov’s performance. The most dramatic move came on 17 November 1938, when it criticized aspects of the NKVD’s work, abolished its troikas that had summarily sentenced so many to death or hard labor, and condemned its excesses. On 23 November 1938, Yezhov submitted his resignation as NKVD chief to Stalin. The Politburo accepted it and replaced him with Beria. Yezhov retained his other party and state positions until he was arrested in April 1939. He was executed on 4 February 1940.
Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 306.
It was Beria’s diagnosis of the danger of Yezhov’s excesses that had induced Stalin to trust him and brought him to power. Throughout the country these excesses had cast their shadow. At one sitting alone, the Central Committee of the Azerbaizhan Party had expelled 279 members, the Ukrainian Stalinsk Provincial Committee 72, the Ordjonikidze Regional Committee 101–it was the same everywhere…. The fear of being suspected of lack of vigilance drove local fanatics to denounce not only Bukharinists, but also Malenkovists, Yezhovists, even Stalinists. It is of course not impossible that they were also egged on to do so by concealed oppositionists! Hence Beria’s task when he was summoned from Georgia by Stalin was to head a secret commission of inquiry into Yezhov’s work.
To give Beria his due, he pulled no punches. At a closed joint session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party, held in the autumn of 1938, he declared that if Yezhov were not a deliberate Nazi agent he was certainly an involuntary one. He had turned the central offices of the NKVD into a breeding ground for fascist agents. He had scorned citizens’ constitutional rights and used illegal methods of extorting information, to such an extent that he had set quite non-political people against the Government. For a rank-and-file member of the Central Committee to say this was the height of courage.
The impression produced on Stalin and Molotov was tremendous. The Central Committee resolutions dismissing Yezhov (Member of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Secretary of the Central Committee, and People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs; were written in Beria’s hand. Beria’s first acts as head of the NKVD, were the arrest of Yezhov and the issue of orders quashing an enormous number of sentences and recently-started proceedings. People who had been unjustly repressed were even indemnified by the State. Special commissions inquired into the past of convicted persons.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 119
Evgeniia Ginsburg, who was in Yaroslavl Prison and who saw no newspapers, said that the prisoners could tell when Yezhov fell: The draconian regime in the prisons (frequent solitary confinement and deprivation of all privileges) was relaxed one day. The timing was confirmed a few days later when Beria’s name began to appear on official prison notices.
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 189
… the replacement of Yezhov by Beria was received as a hopeful sign. And in fact, right after Yezhov’s replacement mass repression was discontinued for a while. Hundreds of thousands of cases then being prepared by the NKVD were temporarily put aside.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 465
KGB Deputy Chairman Vladimir Pirozhkov (I think) makes a public comment including Beria as one of the officials sentenced for violations of Soviet Law.
When asked about the fate of the perpetrators of the repressions and about the statute of limitations, Solomontsev answered:
“With regard to those instances of violations of socialist legality in the ’30s, ’40s, and early ’50s that have been revealed, the culprits have already been punished through criminal, legal, and party channels. It is obviously not a secret to everyone that Avakumov, Ryutin, Leonov, Komarov, Likhachev, Shvartsman, and other former leaders and personnel of the USSR Ministry of State Security were sentenced to death for fabricating investigation materials….”
Even more amazing was an interview given by Pirozhkov, deputy head of the KGB. When asked how many hangmen had been brought to trial, he answered that 1,342 NKVD officials had been sentenced for severe violations of socialist legality, including Beria, Yezhov, Kobulov, Frinovsky, Agranov, Avakumov and others.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 266
and since I’m here, hey @[email protected] want to join in on the infodump? Topic’s Beria. But if you want to include some baller Stalin facts too, that’d be cool.
I don’t blame trump for COVID, but I do blame him for the piss poor response and unnecessary deaths that could have been prevented were it not for willful mismanagement, blatant ignorance, and a cabinet woefully unprepared to deal with a megalomaniac hell bent on letting karma motorboat through a demographic he didn’t find any value in.
I know this nerd has been banned, but for posterity I’ll point out that the circumstances were completely fucking different.
COVID in America: you have a 21st century nation with internet, global trade, well-established information and logistics networks, clear understanding of the extent and nature of the threat, most of the world’s top universities and biomedical research labs, you have fucking hundreds of thousands of people with lifelong specialist training in science, technology, emergency response, public messaging, and any other conceivable discipline relevant to managing a fucking pandemic, and you have all the money on earth to give them.
Soviet famine: you have a rural post-revolutionary state still racing to industrialize and prepare for war, still mostly uneducated and illiterate, no foreign trade, extremely rudimentary information and logistics networks, no way to establish any sort of responsive feedback control loop to manage the situation, and no way to fucking conjure more food out of the ground. There’s no n95 to hand out, no stipend to stay home, no social distancing, no vaccine. All you can do is spread the scraps around and keep the farmers farming and workers working.
Do you want s conversation about this or are you coming set in your ways? That way, we can either talk about your unfounded position or shame will be the best option moving forward on this topic
Those are just facts. He did a lot of horrid shit. Sending a fuckload of people to clog up the Nazi meat grinder with their bodies isn’t heroism, it’s the last desperate act of someone trying to save their own ass.
The Russians that died in the city Stalin named after himself are the heroes who defeated Fascism.
Sending a fuckload of people to clog up the Nazi meat grinder with their bodies isn’t heroism
Except that is just the “mongol horde” myth spread by the nazis. The soviet military was a modern military which fought as a modern military. The “not one step back” order was directed at higher officers who favored unnecessary withdrawals at the expense of ceding territory that the nazis would start exterminating and of leaving the flanks of other army formations vulnerable.
Jesus Christ your example is the single most impressive war in history(edit: actually don’t wanna take away from the Korean comrades or Angolan comrades or vietnamese comrades, they also did amazing) and blaming the General leading it for not being one of the soldiers?? Fuck me, that’s such a terrible example. I’m one of the 70-30 good-bad people on Stalin, which is about 50 percent better than any westen leader ever. But you chose like the literal best thing he ever did that can be attributed at least significantly to him.
He managed to not only keep the Germans waiting too long (where soviets were then able to build up their military during the war to lead to their success) but also pull the rest of the world into the war to their assistance (diplomacy and manoeuvering). Otherwise I don’t think western countries would’ve actually stopped the Nazi’s tbh, or even tried to help.
Of course the millions of dead soviets did the work and died under Stalin. And the rest of the population was saved by the sacrifice and Stalin mourned and celebrated them despite not being on the front lines.
Of course the millions of dead soviets did the work and died under Stalin. And the rest of the population was saved by the sacrifice and Stalin mourned and celebrated them despite not being on the front lines.
You’re right, I took too much credit from him. I guess I meant he never put himself into the situations where death was a 70% certainty like many Soviet soldiers heroically did. But good leadership also means living and being commander when you might not even want to (referring to Stalin wanting to end his position)
Specifically, one guy saying one thing AFTER doing the opposite. (See: Ukrainian Famine 1932)
he said this in an interview in 1936. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1936/03/01.htm
It’s still a good idea. Also, Stalin is still a fucking travesty of a human, as is everyone who enabled him.
The famine being a genocide was misinfo spread by nazi publications such as hearst press. The misinfo was used as justification for murdering Jewish people as “soviet collaborators”
It doesn’t matter if he personally loved every single Ukrainian that died, the fact is that even if you believe everything that was done to mitigate it was a best effort, and that everything that led to the union at large being essentially helpless to feed its people was an accident, it still paints the picture of a big talker that managed a country into the ground.
At best, in the most forgiving light, Stalin was an incompetent head of state, regardless of how smart he was, and was responsible for a lot of people who died reaching out their hands begging for help while he pulled out his pockets and shrugged. And that would have been the end of it, but no, he goes and waxes poetically about how starving people don’t have freedom while the graves are still fresh.
Uh huh so by your logic then every world leader that exists, has existed, and will exist is a genocidal monster on the same level of Stalin because there’s always some form of poverty in the world.
At least you’re consistent with your dumb take.
I suppose if you squint at it and ignore all the other stuff sure? But the problems with famine relief were mainly local and partially caused by kulak sabotage (and they bragged about how effective that sabotage was, you can look it up), when the central committee understood the extent of the problem measures were quickly taken.
If we look at other facts though, like how successful collective farming was at breaking the cycle of famine and how rapidly the Soviets were able to industrialize, quick enough to defeat nazi-ism lose 1/6 of their population in the fight and still make it to space before anyone else, it paints a much better picture of the competence of soviet democratic economic management.
From 1928 to 1939 (the period of full planning pre-war) industrial output increased 350%.
Then why did people starve?
Cite sources showing people starved or you will be banned
Because the rapid industrialization and according massive reorganization of the economy and productive capacity of the country was messy and imperfect. And also because famines are only really uncommon in already industrialized economies.
In addition civil war, kulaks burning food, imperfect management science (Taylorism which had problems with adjusting controlling to the reality on the ground), natural disasters and bad climate for crops. For example even when harvest was going on in plenty of areas the weather was too damp to gather crops at the ideal point in time which greatly diminishes your harvest. The same process could be seen this year in Europe.
The UK did embargo the Soviet Union till Lenin’s NEP and similar things did happen regularly, this means that international finance and industrial capital would’ve often sought other countries in which they didn’t have to fear such things, too. This means that the Soviet Union had to try to generate capital from other sources and those are the the surplus of the working class or the savings of people (vs. consumption).
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And The West™️ will never forgive him for it
Do you honestly believe, that had he run out of warm bodies, he would have thrown himself at the Nazis next?
Run out of warm bodies? Are you on some ruzzian orcs only human wave tactics, no rifle one bullet shit?
The Red Army won the war
When the Nazis were on the outskirts of Moscow, Stalin stood his ground alongside the entire Soviet leadership as the city faced what possibly would’ve been its last moments.
He was literally so close to the front lines the NKVD had to make sure he didn’t accidentally enter any of the minefields that were set up in the city when he took his walks through the city to review the defenses or to go back to his apartment.
absolute unit
Even funnier, or not - it depends I guess - is that I know this because Beria joked about how easy it was for him to assassinate Stalin during the war while the Nazis were outside of Moscow by simply letting him step on a mine.
okay while on beria, is he actually as shit as the libs say
Also some reading on Stalin in Moscow.
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 98
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 134
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 433
Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 37
Martens, Ludo. Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p. 247 [p. 224 on the NET]
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 307
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 309
Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 31
Axell, Albert. Stalin’s War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 168
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 139
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 143
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 148
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 149
Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 361
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 28-30
Aaaa I deleted my long-ass reply
Gimme like an hour or two to get off mobile and give you a quality answer.
Quick answer is: a lot of mystery is around beria that’s still locked away in the soviet archives, and realistically the best way to gage him would be in the writings of those who were around him during the time he was alive. I’m keeping an equally open mind on him as I do with other Soviet leadership.
Okay I hope you like reading.
Beria wasn’t Stalin’s first pick for the Job Beria would later assume
Getty and Manning. Stalinist Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 38
Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 131
One of Stalin’s last living bodyguards liked Beria as much as he liked Kruschev
Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 80
It was likely that Beria played a key role in stopping the greatest excesses of the Ezhovshchina
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 229
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 288
Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 306.
Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 119
Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 189
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 465
KGB Deputy Chairman Vladimir Pirozhkov (I think) makes a public comment including Beria as one of the officials sentenced for violations of Soviet Law.
Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 266
Yeah sorry for infodumping on ya. just to let you know a lot of my comments have comments that include more reading material.
and since I’m here, hey @[email protected] want to join in on the infodump? Topic’s Beria. But if you want to include some baller Stalin facts too, that’d be cool.
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Churchill would have joined the Nazis if they were not a competing empire.
I don’t blame trump for COVID, but I do blame him for the piss poor response and unnecessary deaths that could have been prevented were it not for willful mismanagement, blatant ignorance, and a cabinet woefully unprepared to deal with a megalomaniac hell bent on letting karma motorboat through a demographic he didn’t find any value in.
Sounds pretty familiar yeah?
libs when they have to bring up Trump to cope:
“heh, Trump was basically like Stalin”
I know this nerd has been banned, but for posterity I’ll point out that the circumstances were completely fucking different.
COVID in America: you have a 21st century nation with internet, global trade, well-established information and logistics networks, clear understanding of the extent and nature of the threat, most of the world’s top universities and biomedical research labs, you have fucking hundreds of thousands of people with lifelong specialist training in science, technology, emergency response, public messaging, and any other conceivable discipline relevant to managing a fucking pandemic, and you have all the money on earth to give them.
Soviet famine: you have a rural post-revolutionary state still racing to industrialize and prepare for war, still mostly uneducated and illiterate, no foreign trade, extremely rudimentary information and logistics networks, no way to establish any sort of responsive feedback control loop to manage the situation, and no way to fucking conjure more food out of the ground. There’s no n95 to hand out, no stipend to stay home, no social distancing, no vaccine. All you can do is spread the scraps around and keep the farmers farming and workers working.
Do you want s conversation about this or are you coming set in your ways? That way, we can either talk about your unfounded position or shame will be the best option moving forward on this topic
Those are just facts. He did a lot of horrid shit. Sending a fuckload of people to clog up the Nazi meat grinder with their bodies isn’t heroism, it’s the last desperate act of someone trying to save their own ass.
The Russians that died in the city Stalin named after himself are the heroes who defeated Fascism.
Except that is just the “mongol horde” myth spread by the nazis. The soviet military was a modern military which fought as a modern military. The “not one step back” order was directed at higher officers who favored unnecessary withdrawals at the expense of ceding territory that the nazis would start exterminating and of leaving the flanks of other army formations vulnerable.
Lmao you literally believe nazi propaganda if you’re doing “Enemy At The Gates” level assertions of what the war of the Eastern Front was like
Jesus Christ your example is the single most impressive war in history(edit: actually don’t wanna take away from the Korean comrades or Angolan comrades or vietnamese comrades, they also did amazing) and blaming the General leading it for not being one of the soldiers?? Fuck me, that’s such a terrible example. I’m one of the 70-30 good-bad people on Stalin, which is about 50 percent better than any westen leader ever. But you chose like the literal best thing he ever did that can be attributed at least significantly to him.
He managed to not only keep the Germans waiting too long (where soviets were then able to build up their military during the war to lead to their success) but also pull the rest of the world into the war to their assistance (diplomacy and manoeuvering). Otherwise I don’t think western countries would’ve actually stopped the Nazi’s tbh, or even tried to help.
Of course the millions of dead soviets did the work and died under Stalin. And the rest of the population was saved by the sacrifice and Stalin mourned and celebrated them despite not being on the front lines.
Stalin did went to the front lines multiple times though https://www.rbth.com/history/336242-stalin-front-wwii
You’re right, I took too much credit from him. I guess I meant he never put himself into the situations where death was a 70% certainty like many Soviet soldiers heroically did. But good leadership also means living and being commander when you might not even want to (referring to Stalin wanting to end his position)
tfw your understanding of history comes from Enemy At The Gates